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Form over function? The practical
application of the Recognition of Customary
Marriages Act 1998 in South Africa*
LEA MWAMBENE† AND HELEN KRUUSE‡
‘We must begin to think of family policy in terms of the functions we want the
family to perform and to leave behind our obsession with form’
(Martha Fineman ‘Masking dependency: the political role of family rheto-
ric’(1995) 81 Virginia Law Review 2181 at 2203).
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 is a major
legislative measure for the development of customary marriages in line with
the constitutional principle of equality, speciﬁcally for women. The article
explores the interactions between this ideal in theAct with empirical observa-
tions and the latest judicial decisions concerning its application. It considers
various examples of the lack of protection of women in relationships of a
customary nature, and it concludes that both the state and courts favour a
formal or deﬁnitional approach to customary marriage. In considering alterna-
tive approaches that could adequately protect vulnerable parties, two conclu-
sions emerge: First, the article recommends a wholesale revision of the South
African family law approach from a focus on form to dependency. Second (and
as a short-term measure), the article advocates for the putative marriage
doctrine to be applied in the customary marriage context to protect many
women who are denied access to ‘customary marriage’ as a form, and as a
result, all of the beneﬁts that ﬂow from such marriage.
I INTRODUCTION
The Recognition of Customary MarriagesAct 120 of 1998 (hereafter ‘the
Act’) was passed with the aim, inter alia, of providing for the equal status
and capacity of spouses, speciﬁcally women.1 TheAct is therefore a major
legislative measure for the development of customary marriages in line
* We would like to acknowledge ﬁnancial assistance received from the University of the
Western Cape Senate Research Funds to pursue this topic.
† Diploma in Nursing, LLB (Hons) (Malawi), LLM, LLD (UWC); Senior Lecturer,
University of theWestern Cape.
‡ BA, LLB, LLM, PGDHE (Rhodes); Research Associate, Community Law Centre,
University of theWestern Cape.
1 See preamble to theAct.
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with the constitutional principles of equality.2 In this article, we explore
the interactions between this ideal in the Act with empirical observations
and the latest judicial decisions concerning its application.3 In considering
the (mis)application of the provisions of the Act by both the Department
of Home Affairs4 and courts, we question, in the ﬁrst part of this paper,
whether this laudatory aim has been met.We look at the various examples
of non-protection of women. For example, we note the refusal of Home
Affairs’ ofﬁcials to register customary marriages where the husband is not
present or is deceased, despite clear statutory provisions to the contrary.
We also note a particularly formal approach taken by courts when
determining the validity of a customary marriage, leading to harsh
consequences.
In the second part of the paper we tentatively conclude that both the
state and courts favour a formal or deﬁnitional approach to customary
marriage, despite the Constitutional Court’s explicit endorsement (if not
practice) of the functional approach to family law in general. This formal
approach considers only the deﬁnition of marriage, and whether parties
meet this ‘form’ or ‘deﬁnition’ when determining rights and obligations
ﬂowing from a relationship. In the light of this conclusion, in the last part
of the paper, we explore potential alternatives that could adequately
protect women. In particular, we look at ways in which vulnerable parties
can be protected notwithstanding the validity of their relationship as a
‘marriage’. While we recommend a wholesale revision of our family law
in general, we realise that this is a long-term project. In the meantime, we
advocate for an alternative that could protect most women who are
denied access to ‘customary marriage’ as a form, and as a result, all of the
beneﬁts that ﬂow from such marriage.
II CHANGING THE CONTOURS OF THE DEBATE: FROM
EQUALITYTO DEPENDENCY
There has been little question that the main focus in the customary
marriages debate is the equality right, as contained in s 9 of the Constitu-
2 C Himonga ‘The advancement ofAfrican women’s rights in the ﬁrst decade of democracy
in South Africa: the reform of the customary law of marriage and succession’ 2005 Acta Juridica
82 at 84.
3 These empirical observations rely on the important socio-legal research conducted in
2003 and 2011 by researchers in Kwazulu-Natal and the Western Cape respectively. See
M Mamashela and T Xaba ‘The practical implications and effects of the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act No. 120 of 1998’ Research Report No. 59 (2003) available at
http://sds.ukzn.ac.za/ﬁles/rr59.pdf, accessed on 30 March 2012. See also, in general,Women’s
Legal Centre ‘Recognition of Customary Marriages’ (2011) available at http://www.wlce.co.
za/morph_assets/themelets/explorer/relationship%20rights/general/
Recognition%20of%20Customary%20Marriages.pdf, accessed on 3 November 2011.
4 The Department of HomeAffairs is responsible for the implementation of theAct and thus
we look at the particular conduct of its ofﬁcials in relation to theAct. The Department of Home
Affairs is hereinafter referred to as the ‘state’ for ease of reference.
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tion of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.5 This is not surprising, given
the issues that arise from a system that is largely built on patriarchy.6
However, as will be made clearer below, we believe that the focus on
equality alone in the context of customary marriages has severe practical
and theoretical limitations.7 One such limitation, as recognised by Kaga-
nas and Murray, is that the equality argument can be (and, as we argue
below, has been) used without ensuring that the remedy chosen is
sensitive to the real conditions within which those who are discriminated
against ﬁnd themselves.8 We therefore focus on an approach that ‘draws
our attention to the gap between theory and practice’9 and which rests on
a realist position. Such realist position focuses on the effects of state and
court action on the protection of vulnerable parties.10 It is our argument
that the emphasis on equality in the preamble of theAct has led to a focus
on the relationships between men and women within a customary
marriage, without adequate attention to the basic structure of the institu-
tion of marriage itself as the only normative structure of an intimate
5 JC Bekker ‘How compatible is African customary law with human rights? Some
preliminary observations’ (1994) 57 THRHR 441; TW Bennett ‘The equality clause and
customary law’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 122; M Pieterse ‘The Promotion of Equality and Prevention
of Unfair DiscriminationAct 4 of 2000: ﬁnal nail in the customary law cofﬁn?’ (2000) 117 SALJ
627; andAM Janse vanRensburg ‘Mthembu v Letsela: the non-decision’ (2001) 4 PER 1. Gender
equality has also been the prime motivator for changes within the civil marriage regime. See in
general KTBartlett ‘Feminism and family law’ (1999) 33 Family Law Quarterly 475.
6 Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) para 78; TW Bennett
‘Re-introducing African customary law to the South African legal system’ (2009) 52 American
Journal of Comparative Law 1. See also the comments of the South African Law Reform
Commission in (Project 90) Report on the Traditional Courts and the Judicial Function of Traditional
Leaders (2003) at 10 and 14. Cf TNhlapo ‘African customary law in the interim Constitution’ in
S Liebenberg (ed) The Constitution of South Africa from a Gender Perspective (1995) 162 where he
states that ‘[a]lthough African law and custom has always had [a] patriarchal bias, the colonial
period saw it exaggerated and entrenched through a distortion of custom and practice which, in
many cases, had been either relatively egalitarian or mitigated by checks and balances in favour
of women and the young.’
7 See F Banda ‘Blazing a trail: the African Protocol on Women’s Rights comes into force’
(2006) 50 Journal of African Law 72 at 77 who comments on the problem of linking the use of the
liberal model of equality based on ‘reversing the sexes and comparing’ in the context of
customary marriages. For arguments on the limitations of equality arguments in same-sex
marriages, see M Fineman ‘Masking dependency: the political role of family rhetoric’ (1995) 81
Virginia Law Review 2181 at 2202.
8 F Kaganas and C Murray ‘Law, women and the family: the question of polygyny in a new
SouthAfrica’ 1991 Acta Juridica 116 at 125.
9 MChanock The Making of South African Legal Culture 1902–1936: Fear, Favour and Prejudice
(2001) at 209.
10 Realists argue against formalistic, mechanical application of rigid rules regardless of their
social consequences. Instead, they seek to understand legal rules in terms of their social
consequences. See JW Singer ‘Legal realism at Yale’ as cited by E Engle ‘A primer on left legal
theory: realism, Marxism, CLS and PoMo’ available at http://www.social-sciences-and-
humanities.com/PDF/primer-on-left-legal-theory.pdf, accessed on 30 March 2012.
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relationship worthy of recognition by the state.11 In both state and court
responses to the Act we ﬁnd that the equality focus has led to narrow
questions about the form of a customary marriage. Part of the problem is
that it has been assumed that incorporating certain features of civil
marriage into customary marriage will solve gender inequalities.12 As a
result, customary marriages have been ‘hybridised’13 and most reform to
customary marriages has been aimed at reorganising expressly unequal
gendered roles. For example, changes to customary marriage, including
marital power,14 change in the age and nature of consent,15 and the
requirement of a contract in a second marriage,16 have worked in favour
11 Fineman (n 7) at 2192 notes that ‘the state . . . wields the symbolic power of this normative
structure in order to justify a parsimonious distribution of economic and social subsidies to
nontraditional families.’
12 E Bonthuys ‘Reasonable accommodation as a mechanism to balance equality rights and
rights to religion in family law’ (2010) 25 SA Public Law 666 at 678. Bonthuys gives examples,
such as the legal equality of husbands and wives, community of property as the default
matrimonial property regime and the grounds of divorce in the Act. For example, ch 3, and
ss 18–20 and 24 of ch 4 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 apply in respect of any
customary marriage that is now in community of property (s 7(3) of theAct).
13 M Herbst and W du Plessis ‘Customary law v Common law marriage: a hybrid approach
in South Africa’ vol 12.1 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (May 2008) available at
http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-28.pdf, accessed on 6 January 2012. Bonthuys (n 12) 678.
D Koyana ‘Customary law needs urgent review’ Daily Despatch 27 January 2012, available at
http://www.dispatch.co.za/news/article/2774, accessed on 5 March 2012. Prof Koyana states
in this article that the ‘ ‘‘recognition of customary marriage’’ [in the Act] is a misnomer. It is
really a conversion of customary marriage to English law and the common law of marriage.’
L Mwambene and J Sloth-Nielsen question whether the recognition of customary marriages is
in fact an adaption or modiﬁcation of the traditional customary marriages, leading to a ‘new
form of customary marriage.’ See L Mwambene and J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Talking the talk and
walking the walk: how can the development of customary law be understood?’ (2010) 28 Law
in Context 27 at 31. See also RB Mqeke ‘The ‘‘rainbow jurisprudence’’ and the institution of
marriage with emphasis on the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998’ 1999
Obiter 52; and JC Bekker and G van Niekerk ‘Harmonisation, or the creation of new marriage
laws in SouthAfrica’ (2009) 24 SA Public Law 206 at 221. In the context of customary marriages
outside of South Africa, speciﬁcally those of the Yoruba custom, Laymon suggests that ‘the
imposition of Western legal principles often yields grotesque hybrids of ‘‘law’’ and ‘‘cultural
meaning’’.’ See Lona N Laymon ‘Valid-where-consummated: the intersection of customary
marriages and formal adjudication’ (2001) 10 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 353
at 360.
14 Prior to the Act, customary marriages included the notion of tutelage – the placing of a
married woman under the guardianship of her husband as a perpetual minor. See s 11(3) of the
Black Administration Act 38 of 1927, which was replaced by s 6 of the Act. See also J Sinclair
and J Heaton The Law of Marriage vol 1 (1996) 173 fn 479 and JC Bekker and N van Schalkwyk
‘AllAfrican women may at last own property: particularly land’ (2005) 38 De Jure 395 at 396.
15 The Act requires that parties be over 18 years (s 3(1)(a)). This accords with the African
Protocol on Women’s Rights (art 6(b)).The consent of both the bridegroom and of the bride is
necessary in terms of s 3(1)(a)(ii) of the Act. Again this accords with the African Protocol on
Women’s Rights (art 6(a)). In older times, it was alleged that the bride’s consent in customary
law was not necessary. This was changed by the courts: see AJ Kerr ‘Customary law’ in B Clark
(ed) Family Law Service (2008) para G-33 and JG Horn and AM Janse van Rensburg ‘Practical
implications of the recognition of customary marriages’ (2002) 27 Journal for Juridical Science 54
at 58.
16 Section 7(6) of theAct.
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of a more formally equal regime. However, these changes have failed to
question the focus on the form of marriage itself, and as a result, have
failed to eradicate the essential hierarchy in the marriage relationship.17
For example, the Act requires a husband who wishes to be a party to a
polygamous union to apply to court to approve a written contract, which
will regulate the future matrimonial property system of his marriages.18 It
is envisaged that the wife will be joined in the proceedings.19 Notwith-
standing this requirement, it appears that only two or three contracts have
been registered for polygamous marriages since the inception of the Act,
despite the reality that there are many more polygamous marriages in
South Africa.20 The result of such non-compliance with form has led to
uncertainty for women in the marriage(s), since it appears that the second
marriage is void if parties are from the Tsonga community21 and else-
wheremay be valid, despite lack of consent by the ﬁrst wife or the fact that
no provision was made for the marital property regimes.22 From the
foregoing observations, it appears as if this lack of certainty is directly
dependent on the (in)action of the ‘husband’.23 It seems to us then as if the
17 Fineman correctly notes that the issuance of a marriage certiﬁcate ‘does not determine the
conduct of any speciﬁc marriage, what it means to its participants, or how those participants will
function within the relationship. The laws governing marriage leave the day-to-day implemen-
tation of marriage to the individuals.’ See M Fineman ‘Why marriage?’(2001–2002) 9 Virginia
Journal of Social Policy and the Law 239 at 241.
18 Section 7(6) of theAct.
19 Section 7(8) of the Act. See C Himonga Challenges of Implementing section 7(6) of the
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act in South Africa Unpublished paper presented at a
University of Cape Town, Law, Race and Gender Research Unit seminar ‘The Rights of
Women Under Customary Law in SouthernAfrica: Reﬂecting on theWork of theWomen and
Law in SouthernAfrica (WLSA) Research’ (August 2010).
20 SeeWomen’s Legal Centre (n 3) at 18 fn 45. See also in general C Himonga ‘Transforming
customary law of marriage in South Africa and the challenges of its implementation with
speciﬁc reference to matrimonial property’ (2004) 32 Int J of Legal Information 260.
21 According to the Constitutional Court challenge heard on 30 May 2013, Mayelane v
Ngwenyama and Another 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC) (30 May 2013) second marriages, in the Tsonga
community, are void in the absence of the ﬁrst wife’s consent. This challenge was as a result of
the SCA judgment of Ngwenyama v Mayelane 2012 (4) SA 527 (SCA) wherein the court found
that the second marriage should be valid despite non-compliance with s 7(6). This judgment
differed from the judgment in the court a quo (recorded as MM v MN 2010 (4) SA 286 (GNP))
which held that the second marriage had to be declared void for three reasons: (1) to ﬁnd
differently would render s 7(6) superﬂuous, which the legislature clearly did not intend; (2)
s 7(6) reads that the husband ‘must make application to the court’, indicating that non-
compliance will lead to voidness (ibid at para 25 with reference to Minister of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism v Pepper Bay Fishing (Pty) Ltd; Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v
Smith 2004 (1) SA308 (SCA) para 32); and (3) to ﬁnd differently would be a gross infringement
of the ﬁrst or earlier spouses’ fundamental rights. See also J Heaton South African Family Law 3 ed
(2010) 224 (and the references cited therein).
22 The Act does not explicitly state voidness as a consequence of non-compliance with
section 7(6), but is set out in peremptory language (viz. the husband must . . . ).
23 The result of such non-compliance has been characterised as ‘the discarded-spouse’
debate. The possible voidness of the second marriage, leading to the lack of protection of the
second ‘spouse’ has been severely criticised. See, for example, the obiter dicta in MG v BM 2012
(2) SA253 (GSJ) paras 23ff (and the references cited therein), IPMaithuﬁ and GMB Moloi ‘The
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focus in the customary marriage debate has been on the internal inequities
and injustices in male-female relations, but seen only through the prism of
the institution of marriage.24 In other words, these changes reﬂect the
primacy of civil marriage as the normative family form,25 which has tried
to situate customary marriages in a formal system with ‘simple dichoto-
mous terms such as married and unmarried’.26 This problem appears to be
epistemological, as indicated by Clark: it is ‘a problem of viewing the
customary law as an objective reality, as a body of rules, rather than as an
ongoing historical phenomenon’.27 This has meant that, overwhelmingly,
the state and courts have failed to come to the assistance of women in
these relationships where they are unable to comply with ‘form’,28 as seen
primarily through the process of registration and validation of these
marriages. This is extremely problematic given the generally-held view
that factors such as poverty, unemployment, the legacy of labour
migrancy and unequal gender relations have inﬂuenced the way in which
family formation takes place in SouthAfrica.29
need for the protection of rights of partners to invalid marital relationships: a revisit of the
‘‘discarded spouse’’ debate’ (2005) 38 De Jure 144 and M Mamashela and M Carnelley ‘The
Catch 22 situation of widows from polygamous marriages being discarded under customary
law’ (2011) 25 Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity 112. Interestingly, the Muslim
Marriages Bill (which seeks to give recognition to Muslim marriages in SouthAfrica, published
for comment in January 2011), makes it a criminal offence where the husband fails to enter into
a similar contract provision. In terms of s 8(11), the husband is liable to a ﬁne not exceeding
R20 000. While this approach certainly encourages husbands to enter into such contracts, the
provisions of the Muslim Marriages Bill (if enacted as is) will apply only to those who ‘opt-in’ to
the statutory regime (s 2(1)), rendering the protection potentially ineffective.
24 For an analysis of shortcomings of this approach in the context of recognising Muslim
marriages, see D Meyerson ‘Who’s in and who’s out? Inclusion and exclusion in the family law
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of South Africa’ (2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review
295.
25 See references in n 7 above. See also Bonthuys (n 12) at 678.
26 Laymon (n 13) at 357.
27 B Clark ‘History of the Roman-Dutch law of marriage from a socio-economic perspec-
tive’ in DVisser (ed) Essays on the History of Law (1989) 159 at 192.
28 The statement here may be misleading, for in certain cases (as argued below) the courts
have misinterpreted a requirement of customary marriage, for example, this is what both De
Koker (n 62) and Janse van Rensburg (n 5) argue in relation to the ‘non-decision’on the validity
of the marriage in Mthembu v Letsela 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA). Both authors argue that the lobolo
did not have to be paid in full for the marriage to be valid.
29 Clark (n 27) at 191.MChanock ‘Neither customary nor legal:African customary law in an
era of family law reform’ (1989) 3 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 72 at 82.
Goldblatt posits that these factors affect predominately poor, black women (B Goldblatt
‘Regulating domestic partnerships – a necessary step in the development of South African
family law’ (2003) 120 SALJ 610 at 616.) See Mamashela and Xaba (n 3); B Meyersfeld ‘If you
can see, look: domestic partnerships and the law’ (2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 271 at
282; and B Smith ‘The interplay between registered and unregistered domestic partnerships
under the draft domestic partnerships bill, 2008 and the potential role of the putative marriage
doctrine’ (2011) 128 SALJ 560 at 562 for their discussion of these factors in relation to the
formation of domestic partnerships in SouthAfrica.
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In what follows, then, we consider this obsession with form in (1) the
registration process; and (2) the validation of marriages through the
courts.
III OBSESSION WITH FORM
(1) The State: registration process
While it may seem surprising, the state has been a relative latecomer in the
registration of marriage. In both English and Roman-Dutch law, any
control of marriage was in the hands of the church and canon law, not the
state.30 This situation changed with control turning from church to state.
In South Africa, public registration of a kind was required for civil
marriages since the early European settlement at the Cape of Good
Hope.31 Contrasted with civil marriages, prior to the commencement of
the Act, it was not necessary to register customary marriages, except in
Kwa-Zulu Natal.32 While parties could register their marriages in the
Transkei, it had no effect on the validity of the marriage.33 One can
understand the fact that registration was not vital under customary law in
earlier times: family elders were usually always available to testify to the
celebration of a marriage.34 This meant that not many couples registered
their marriages. In addition, as stated in MG v BM,35 it was a ‘notorious
fact’ that the registration of customary marriages prior to 1994 was almost
non-existent due to the negative attitude towards customary law. Fur-
thermore, in the context of control of property residing with the family
head,36 and the rejection of the private law property concept,37 it would
30 For example, public registration of English marriages was only required by theAct for the
Better Prevention of Clandestine Marriages in 1753 (better known as Lord Hardewicke’s Act).
See MACase ‘Marriage licenses’ (2005) 89 Minnesota Law Review 1758 at 1767.
31 HR Hahlo Law of Husband and Wife 5 ed (1985) 15ff. See also B van Heerden ‘Marriage’ in
Joubert (ed) Law of South Africa vol 16 (1992) para 12, who gave the rationale for such
registration: ‘Marriage . . . confers on the parties a status of a public character’. See also Holland v
Holland 1973 (1) SA 897 (T) 899F–H: ‘marriage . . . is part of the jus publicum . . . [it] is thus of
interest to the State. . . .’
32 Herbst and Du Plessis (n 13). See ss 44–50 of the KwaZulu-Natal Codes on Zulu Law.
33 TW Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (2004) 218; Kambule v The Master of the High
Court 2007 (4) All SA 898 (E). But cf Kwitshane v Magalela 1999 (4) SA 610 (Tk) and Tshatela v
Qendwana [2001] JOL 7672 (Tk). Interestingly, the Transkei Legislative Assembly passed the
Transkeian Customary Unions Registration Act 3 of 1971, which provided for compulsory
registration (s 3). However, theAct never came into force. See DG Koyana Customary Law in a
Changing Society (1980) 145.
34 Bennett (n 33) at 217. T Nhlapo ‘The Customary Marriages Act: background and
rationale’ in S Bah and S Rama (eds) Towards Improving the Registration of Marriages and Divorces in
South Africa: Proceedings from a National Workshop (1999). Nhlapo states: ‘[t]raditionally people
don’t consider registration of their marriages to be a high priority.’
35 MG v BM supra (n 23) para 10.
36 Bennett (n 33) at 322 and 337.
37 CRM Dlamini ‘The role of customary law in meeting social needs’ 1991 Acta Juridica 71 at
76 and Bennett (n 33) at 374ff. See also Kaganas and Murray (n 8) at 121 where they state that
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appear that proof of the marriage was not integral for the purposes of
speciﬁc beneﬁts.38
However, given various provisions of the Act39 and the decisions in
Bhe40 and Gumede41 –where private law property concepts,42 civil law
proprietary regimes, and the equal status between spouses impact directly
on the customary union – one can well understand the need for evidence
of customary law marriages.43 This need for evidence in proving the
customary marriage is made problematic in an urban context where there
is usually no close-knit community to assist in issues of proof.44
Given the increasing need for a ‘public character’ for customary
marriage, together with the ‘hybridising’ of customary marriages, it is not
surprising then that the Law Reform Commission’s (SALRC) Discussion
Paper on customary marriages recommended that registration was neces-
sary to provide proof of the marriage to third parties, as well as to
determine the matrimonial property system.45 This recommendation was
made, no doubt, in the light of bureaucratic demands of proof to the array
of beneﬁts that are available to those in marriages (and civil unions) in
South Africa.46 It was also made in the light of South Africa’s obligations
under the UN Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion againstWomen,47 and the UN Convention on Consent to Marriage,
MinimumAge for Marriage and Registration of Marriage.48
To this end then, the Act requires that spouses in a customary marriage
have a duty to ensure that their marriage is registered within three months
customary law was designed to meet the needs of a rural, pre-industrial and patriarchal society
(further stating that such design is ill-equipped to deal with the reality of contemporary
women’s lives).
38 Similarly, Budlender et al posit that if earnings and property are limited (especially in the
rural areas), it is unlikely that a rural couple would see the need to register their customary
marriage. See D Budlender, N Chobokoane and S Simelane ‘Marriage patterns in SouthAfrica:
methodological and substantive issues’ (2004) 9 Southern Africa Journal of Demography 1 at 4.
39 For example, ss 6 and 7(2) of theAct.
40 Bhe supra (n 6).
41 Gumede (born Shange) v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 (3) SA152 (CC).
42 Cf the conclusion of Mamashela and Xaba (n 3) that ‘traditional societies neither men nor
women had individual rights to property’.
43 See Chanock who stated that an obvious consideration in thinking about the family unit
was that ‘[c]ustomary law was not simply family law. It provided for a whole social order,
regulating political authority, wrongs and injuries, land distribution, the ownership of property,
the rights and capacities to exchange goods, and labour.’ M Chanock ‘Law, state and culture:
thinking about ‘‘customary law’’ after apartheid’ 1991 Acta Juridica 52 at 68.
44 Bennett (n 33) at 217–218.
45 South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) Discussion Paper 76 (Project 90) The
Harmonization of the Common Law and the Indigenous Law: Conflicts of Law (1998) paras 4.5.6–8
and 4.5.18.
46 For example, for record-keeping purposes, facilitating property transfers upon death etc.
47 Article 16(2) of 1249 UNTS 13; adopted 18 December 1979; instrument of ratification deposited
on 15 December 1995; entry into force 3 September 1981.
48 Article 3 of 521 UNTS 231; adopted 10 December 1962; instrument of ratification deposited on
29 January 1993; entry into force 9 December 1964. See in general, Bennett (n 33) at 218–219.
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of celebration thereof.49 Where marriages were entered into before the
commencement of the Act, spouses were given 12 months to have their
unions registered.50 Such period was last extended to 31 December
2010.51 Section 4(2) expressly states that either spouse may apply for the
registration of his or her customary marriage, subject to compliance with
the prescribed forms.52 In addition, s 4(7) provides that a court can also
order the registration of a marriage. As in the case of Transkei customary
marriages, s 4(9) states that failure to register a customary marriage does not
affect the validity of that marriage. Despite registration not being a bar to
validity, a spouse who is not in possession of a certiﬁcate of registration
(and where the state refuses to register the marriage) has to approach a
court for an order in this regard.53
It is clear from the requirements of theAct that either of the spouses may
register the marriage.54 The problem in the context of this article is that
most persons only seek to register the marriage where there is a dispute or
where one (or both) spouses are deceased.55 The Act makes provision for
the latter situation by allowing for persons other than the spouses to
enquire into the existence of the marriage, should they be able to show
that they have sufﬁcient interest in the matter.56 This provision obviously
allows for the marriage to be registered after the death of one or both of
the spouses57 once the registering ofﬁcer is satisﬁed that a marriage exists
or has existed between the spouses.
Despite registration not being essential to the validity of the marriage,
the reality is that:
(i) Spouses cannot access pension beneﬁts, inherit property or divorce
without a registration certiﬁcate.58
49 Section 4.
50 Section 4(3)(a). It should be noted that the lack of such registration, as mentioned above,
should not affect the marriage’s validity.
51 In terms of GN 51 GG 32916 of 5 February 2010.
52 See Form A contained in GN R1101 GG 21700 of 1 November 2000 and amended by
GN R359 GG 25023 of 14 March 2003.
53 Section 4(7)(a). See Baadjies v Matubela 2002 (3) SA427 (W) para 17 and Mabuza v Mbatha
[2003] 1All SA706 (C).
54 Section 4(2).
55 See Women’s Legal Centre (n 3) at 12. See also Mamashela and Xaba (n 3). It appears as if
the majority of those in customary marriages did not register their marriages prior to the Act as
well. The SALRC notes that any measures to encourage registration of marriage was
abandoned from early on; see SALRC (n 45) at 71 fn 121. SeeMaithuﬁ andMoloi (n 23) at 145.
See also the factual scenario in MG v BM supra (n 23).
56 Section 5. See M Meyer ‘The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 1998’ (2008) 14
South African Deeds Journal 9 who gives examples of who might qualify as a ‘sufﬁciently
interested person’under this provision.
57 Heaton (n 21) at 208.
58 Women’s Legal Centre (n 3) at 12. See, for example, Baadjies v Matubela supra (n 53) where
a woman could not obtain maintenance in terms of a Rule 43 application without a valid
registration certiﬁcate.
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(ii) Regulations make the registration process a relatively cumbersome
process59 and imply additional requirements not expressly set out in the
Act.60
(iii) Men (or if the man is deceased, his relatives) may resist registration so as
to resist sharing of the marital property, or of the deceased estate,
respectively.61
(iv) Where there is no registration, proving the existence of the marriage by
other means (the alternative to registration provided for in the Act) may
be a formidable task.62
(v) Where the Department of Home Affairs refuses to register the marriage,
parties often lack real access to courts to challenge such refusal,63 given
both their geographic location and ﬁnancial constraints.64
59 Regulations require that identity books be presented, a requirement which is problematic
given that many of those in the rural areas are without identity books. Spouses may also be
illiterate or semi-literate which makes the completion of many forms difﬁcult. See Budlender et
al (n 38) at 4.
60 For example, Form A requires that the terms of a lobolo agreement be set out despite no
express requirement of lobolo in the Act. Also reg 2(1) provides spaces for both spouses to sign
Form A, despite the statutory provision that either spouse can apply for registration. Finally,
there have been indications (in the form of circulars) that the Department of Home Affairs
requires both spouses to sign: see Manual B1 1699 and Circular 53 of 2000.
61 Budlender et al (n 38) at 4. The authors also posit that if earnings and property are limited
(especially in the rural areas), the chances of a couple registering their customary marriage is
limited. See also L Mbatha ‘Recognising customary marriages’ (1998) 3 Gender Research Project
Bulletin 5 where, after interviewing women, she notes that non-registration often results from
‘men playing delaying tactics by either failing to create time to register the marriage, blaming it
on work, or by a general refusal to create time.’ In the context of polygamous marriages, it may
be that one of the surviving spouses may also deny the validity of a marriage so as to avoid
sharing. This was the case in MG v BM supra (n 23) para 12, where the court opined that the ﬁrst
wife sought to contest the validity of the second marriage because of ‘greed to exclude the
applicant from the assets of the deceased’.
62 IP Maithuﬁ ‘The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act of 1998: a commentary’
(2000) 63 THRHR 509 at 516. See also J de Koker ‘Proving the existence of a customary law
marriage’2001 TSAR 257 discussing the various decisions in Mthembu v Letsela 1997 (2) SA936
(T) before Le Roux J, Mthembu v Letsela 1998 (2) SA675 (T) before Mynhardt J, and Mthembu v
Letsela 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA). See also Laymon (n 13) at 362 who makes the valid point that
courts usually give more evidentiary weight to documents like marriage licences, prenuptial
agreements, and written acknowledgments of a marriage than they give to witnesses’ narration
about the ceremonial process.
63 As provided for in s 4(7), also ss 2(1) and 3(1) of theAct. Despite the lack of a link between
the latter section, this view appears to be conﬁrmed by the court in Baadjies (n 53), which found
that the failure to prove registration of a customary marriage constituted a failure to prove the
existence of the marriage. Similarly, where there is a marriage certiﬁcate, it seems that the court
will be hesitant to ﬁnd that the marriage is invalid. This was the case in M v M (20622/06)
[2009] ZAGPPHC 109 (10 September 2009). Here the court held (at para 16) that‘[i]n the face
of the marriage certiﬁcate issued by the Department and the absence of acceptable evidence on
the part of the defendant to rebut the marriage certiﬁcate . . . this court cannot even consider
the defendant’s version that a valid marriage didn’t come into being and the plaintiff must
therefore succeed with her action for divorce.’
64 Women’s Legal Centre (n 3) at 12. See also V Bronstein ‘Confronting custom in the new
South African state: an analysis of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998’
(2000) 16 SAJHR 558.
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From the foregoing section, therefore, the reality is that the registration
process is integral in protecting women. This notwithstanding the fact
that there is no express link between registration and validity of a
marriage.65
In considering the state’s approach to the registration process, Banda’s
statement in 2006 is prescient. She stated then that ‘[i]t would be
unfortunate if an instrument [viz registration] designed to be for the
protection of women led to their legal disenfranchisement’.66 This
appears to be the case from reported legal interventions by the Women’s
Legal Centre Trust in Cape Town.67 These case studies show numerous
occasions when the Department of HomeAffairs, which is responsible for
registration, has refused to register customary marriages for spurious
reasons, which, in turn, has led to the disenfranchisement of women.
These cases can be grouped into two subsets of scenarios, with both
ultimately stemming from the misguided notion that both spouses must
be present to register the marriage.68 In the ﬁrst subset, the state refused to
register a marriage where the husband was still alive, because he refused to
assist in the process. Such refusal was premised on resisting an action for
divorce69 or occurred in the context of abuse by the husband.70 In the
second subset, the state refused to register a marriage where the husband
was deceased,71 despite statutory provisions allowing for this very situa-
tion. This practice goes against the explicit wording of the Act, which
only requires one spouse to be present to apply for registration, and which
contemplates the possibility of registration post-death of one of the
parties.72 Finally, the state has been inconsistent in whether it will register
a marriage entered into before the commencement of theAct, where such
attempted registration takes place after the extension date of 31 December
65 SeeWomen’s Legal Centre (n 3) at 12.
66 Banda (n 7) at 76. The potential for disenfranchisement of women was predicted in the
SALRC Report (n 6) at para 4.5.18 when it stated that ‘[t]o rule that unregistered unions are
void would work great hardship for the spouses and would deprive many existing unions of
potential validity. Hence, where a marriage has not been registered, the parties should be
permitted to allege other forms of proof of its existence’.
67 Women’s Legal Centre (n 3) at 13.
68 As implied by the requirements of FormAof theAct.
69 Case reported as ‘Dada’, seeWomen’s Legal Centre (n 3) at 13.
70 Case reported as ‘Mehlomakhulu’, ibid.
71 Case reported as ‘Ntlonze’, ibid. This case accords with similar ﬁndings in KwaZulu-Natal
by Mamashela and Xaba (n 3).
72 While it is beyond the scope of this paper, this practice seems deliberate in the sense that
such practice simulates what is being proposed by the Draft Recognition of Customary
Marriages Amendment Bill published for comment in 2009. In terms of this Bill, inter alia, both
spouses must be present (clause 4(a) requires both spouses to make the application together). In
addition, clause 4(c) deletes s 4(5)(a) of the Act, which allows a person with a sufﬁcient interest
to make application for registration of a marriage.
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2010.73 Where the state has refused, this has meant that women have had
to go to court to prove the validity of their marriage, which has often
translated into a ‘dead end’ for these women, given lack of real access to
courts.74
(2) The courts: validity of marriages
Before we embark on an account of the approach in which courts have
(mis)applied the Act, some consideration needs to be given to prevailing
modus operandi in which the Act has been applied. In considering the
decisions of the courts, we note that in many cases women believed that
they had concluded a valid customary marriage.75 But later either the
husband76 or the relatives of the deceased husband, mainly interested in
the deceased’s intestate estate,77 ‘would come to court insisting that as the
formalities had not been followed, the marriage was not valid’.78 Our
main concern, however, is with how the approach of the courts has
73 See letter from Department of Home Affairs, quoted in MG v BM supra (n 23) para 8, as
well as the case study ‘Lungile Nkosi’ cited inWomen’s Legal Centre (n 3) at 14, where the state
refused to register the marriage post-extension. However, a Department of Home Affairs
Circular 27 of 2008 apparently instructed ofﬁcials to continue registering marriages – at least
before the last extension period –whether themarriages were concluded before or after theAct.
SeeWomen’s Legal Centre (n 3) ibid.
74 See Bronstein (n 64) 562; Horn and Janse van Rensburg (n 15) at 63; Himonga (n 2) at
106; and IP Maithuﬁ and JC Bekker ‘The existence and proof of customary marriages for
purposes of Road Accident Fund claims’ (2009) 30 Obiter 164 at 173 regarding problems
relating to access to courts. Mamashela and Xaba reported in 2003 (n 3) that the Department of
Home Affairs would only register a marriage where the person who wanted to register the
marriage brought the entire marriage party to their ofﬁces, including immediate family
members of both families. Such an entourage necessitated the hiring of a minibus, an expense
that fell outside of the means of the person wishing to register the marriage.
75 See, for example, the cases of Mthembu supra (n 28); Motsoatsoa v Roro [2011] 2 All SA 324
(GSJ); Fanti v Boto 2008 (5) SA405 (C); and Ndlovu v Mokoena 2009 (5) SA400 (GNP). See also
Janse van Rensburg (n 5) at 57 andWomen’s Legal Centre (n 3).
76 For example, in M v M supra (n 63), the defendant, husband to the applicant, in
challenging the division of the joint estate sought by the wife after divorce, alleged that there
was no valid customary marriage because the requirement of full delivery of lobolo was not met
by him.
77 In MG v BM supra (n 23) the applicant (ﬁrst wife to the deceased) challenged the validity
of the marriage between the deceased and the ﬁrst respondent (second wife to the deceased)
because of the disagreement over the distribution of the deceased estate. See also Motsoatsoa
supra (n 75) (discussed later in this paper under lobolo), in which the right to inherit the deceased
house was at risk. In addition, in Matlala v Dlamini and Another (35611/2008) [2010]
ZAGPPHC 277 (3 June 2010), the applicant, the mother to the deceased, sought an order to
declare that no valid marriage existed between the deceased and the ﬁrst respondent and, more
important to our discussion, the applicant also sought an order to the effect that the ﬁrst
respondent (wife to the deceased) should not be entitled to any beneﬁts from the estate or
pension funds of the deceased.
78 Chanock (n 9) at 294. See also Justice College Customary Marriages Bench Book (2004) ch 3
at 11, where it was also noted that the validity of a marriage is only likely to be questioned where
there is dispute over resources, available at http://www.judicialeducation.org.za/ﬁles/
userﬁles/ﬁle/MagCourts/Customary%20Marriage%20Bench%20Book.pdf, accessed on 20
April 2012.
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pushed the Act towards, what Chanock79 has called ‘a deﬁnition of
requirements and criteria of validity’, which we argue protects no one,
especially the vulnerable, but the institution of marriage itself.
The requirements for the validity of a customary marriage are provided
under s 2(1)80 and (2)81 of the Act. For customary marriages concluded
after the Act, the requirements are age, consent, and that the marriage
must be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance with
customary law.82 Age and consent, as provided under s 3(1)(a)(i) and (ii),
are straight forward to determine and have thus far not attracted the
attention of courts. Section 3(1)(b) of the Act, however, states that ‘the
marriage must be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance
with customary law’, with no further guidance as to the essential require-
ments of custom.83 For that reason, courts are left to decide what, in a
given case, are the essential requirements of custom, which has led to a
number of conﬂicting decisions.84 These decisions are mainly based on
customary requirements of lobolo and customary ceremonies (formal
integration of a woman into her husband’s family home),85 which
79 Chanock (n 9) at 332. See also Clark (n 27) at 192 in relation to the problem of ﬁxed
criteria in customary marriages.
80 Section 2(1) provides that ‘a marriage which is a valid marriage at customary law and
existing at the commencement of this Act is for all purposes recognised as a marriage’. The
requirements for the validity of marriages recognised under s 2(1) are therefore those that were
recognised at customary law before theAct came into force, which include: consent of families;
consent of both parties; lobolo and marriage ceremonies (see discussion by Bennett (n 33) at 194;
andASkelton and M Carnelley (eds) Family Law in South Africa (2010) 180.)
81 Section 2(2) of the Act provides that ‘a customary marriage entered into after the
commencement of this Act, which complies with the requirements of this Act, is for all
purposes recognised as a marriage’.
82 The requirements of these marriages are provided under s 3(1) of the Act which provides
for the following: (a) the prospective spouses (i) must both be above the age of 18 years; and
(ii) must both consent to be married to each other under customary law; and (b) the marriage
must be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance with customary law.
83 See also Mwambene and Sloth-Nielsen (n 13) at 30; Women’s Legal Centre (n 3) at 8; and
Herbst and Du Plessis (n 13) at 8. Thus, Justice College (n 78) has observed: ‘the wording in this
provision seems to capture the nature of customary marriage as a process rather than an event.’
In addition, Justice College (ibid) observed what Comaroff and Roberts pointed out: that in
Tswana culture there is no deﬁning moment between one’s status as married and single, and
there are a variety of relations between Tswana men and women which may result in rights to
support or alimony upon separation.
84 For example, the cases of Motsoatsoa supra (n 75), Mthembu supra (n 28), Ndlovu supra
(n 75) and Fanti supra (n 75).
85 The Act does not deﬁne what ceremonies need to take place, ‘but leaves room for
communities to develop or follow the ones always practiced’ (recommendation by SALRC, as
cited by Justice College (n 78) at 23. The SALRC, as cited by Justice College (n 78) at 24,
reported that ‘customary law always tends to be ﬂexible and pragmatic. Ceremonies may be
abbreviated as circumstances dictate, and especially in urban areas, they may be ignored
altogether. Even within a close-knit community, opinions may vary on how essential a ritual is
and how it should be performed (at 4.4.8). Thus, in Mabena v Letsealo 1998 (2) SA 1068 (T)
(decided before the Act) for example, the court upheld a marriage that had been negotiated by
the mother of the bride instead of the father or male guardian as required by custom. On the
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Bennett,86 among others,87 has pointed out characterise a marriage as
customary in nature.88
Several authors have discussed issues of lobolo and customary ceremo-
nies as requirements for determining the validity of a customary marriage,
despite these not being speciﬁcally mentioned under s 3(1) of theAct.89 It
is therefore not necessary for us to repeat them. It is, however, important
to underscore the fact that for purposes of our discussion, the focus is on
how the courts’ approach to the institutions of lobolo and customary
ceremonies, as essential requirements to conclude a valid customary
marriage, affects the protection of vulnerable parties.
(a) Lobolo
Lobolo has been deﬁned as ‘property in cash or kind . . . which a
prospective husband or head of his family undertakes to give to the head
of a prospective wife’s family in consideration of a customary marriage’.90
Lobolo could consist of cattle, other animals or cash, as agreed by the
parties. There is no standard rule applicable in all communities on the
amount, nature and payment of lobolo as a requirement for the validity of a
customary marriage.91 Communities have different practices.92 Courts
importance of formal integration of a woman into the husband’s family as a requirement
(discussed below), see the cases of Fanti supra (n 75); Ndhlovu supra (n 75).
86 TW Bennett ‘Legal pluralism and the family in South Africa: lessons from customary law
reform’ (2011) 25 Emory International Law Review 1029 at 1046.
87 Koyana (n 33) at 5 who has observed that lobolo custom is ‘a thread through all Black
nations of Southern Africa’. See also JC Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law in Southern Africa
(1989) 151 who has described lobolo as ‘a rock on which the Africans’ marriage is founded’ and
thus an essential feature of a customary marriage (by Koyana as well).
88 Historically, s 11(1) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 provided that a court
could not ﬁnd that the tradition of lobolo was against natural justice and public policy. After the
Act, Dlamini, cited by LL Mofokeng ‘The lobola agreement as the silent prerequisite for the
validity of a customary marriage in terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act’
(2005) 68 THRHR 277 at 279, observed: ‘Blacks in general are unable to regard a relationship
as a marriage even if there can be compliance with all legal requirements if lobolo has not been
delivered or an agreement for its delivery [has not been] concluded.’ This observation can be
supported by an unpublished study by Govender, which shows that 85 per cent of women
interviewed indicated whole-hearted support for the system of lobolo. See P Govender The
Status of Women Married in terms of African Customary Law: A Study of Women’s Experiences in the
Eastern Cape and Western Cape Provinces (2000) 29. These ﬁndings point to the fact that women
are supportive of the lobolo institution when it comes to the validity of a customary marriage.
89 See for example, Mafokeng (n 88) at 277;Women’s Legal Centre (n 3).
90 See s 1 of theAct. It should be however noted that, despite its deﬁnition in theAct, lobolo is
not a requirement to conclude a valid customary marriage (s 3(1) of the Act). Lobolo has also
been deﬁned by Mafokeng (n 88) at 278 as ‘an agreement between the family group of the
prospective husband and the family group of the prospective wife that on or before the marriage
ceremony, there would be the transfer of property from the family group of the husband to the
family group of the wife in respect of the marriage’ and by Seymour as cited by Koyana (n 33) at
5 as ‘a rock on which the Africans’ marriage is founded’ and thus an essential feature of a
customary marriage.
91 Koyana (n 33) at 5, and Bennett (n 33) at 225.
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are therefore required to take into account these different practices and
the facts presented before them in disputes pertaining to validity of
customary marriage on the issue of lobolo.93
Courts’ decisions are contradictory as to whether partial or full pay-
ment of or mere agreement to pay lobolo, as prescribed by a particular
custom or agreed by parties, is essential for the validity of a customary
marriage. Some court decisions seem to suggest that mere negotiations on
the issue of lobolo would sufﬁce.Aprimary source for this suggestion is the
Constitutional Court dictum in Bhe and Other v Khayelitsha Magistrate94
where it was said that ‘it is not a requirement that lobolo should be paid in
full before a marriage is concluded. An ‘‘agreement’’ to pay lobolo is
sufﬁcient’. Similarly, in Matlala v Dlamini and Another95 the court
observed: ‘I assume that an ‘‘agreement’’ between the families as to the
amount of lobolo to be paid (where the lobolo consists of money) is a
prerequisite for a valid customary marriage’.96
A good example where a court concluded that mere agreement to
lobolo sufﬁces is the case of Nthejane and Another v Road Accident Fund,97 in
which the plaintiff, acting on behalf of her minor son Bongani, sued the
defendant for damages arising out of the death of her deceased husband,
the biological father of her son. The plaintiff was Sotho. The brief facts of
this case were that the parties agreed to enter into lobolo negotiations.
These negotiations took place and it was agreed that the deceased family
would give 10 cows as lobolo. The parties also agreed that delivery of lobolo
was to take place at a later stage. The defendant, however, contended that
the plaintiff could not have entered into a customary union, as this lobolo
had not been paid.98 The issue for the court to decide was whether or not
the plaintiff was married to the deceased in terms of a customary union.99
The court observed that the ‘lobolo agreement’ was acceptable to both
families and that therefore the arrangement was in accordance with their
92 Thus, Bennett (n 33) at 225–228 observed that as a general rule, there is no uniformity
regarding the size of lobolo and the manner in which it is determined. For example, among the
Tsonga people, the size is determined by negotiation and agreement between the parties;
among the Sotho and Venda people the size is determined by traditional custom, usually having
a ﬁxed amount; among the Tswanas, the size is determined unilaterally by the family of the
groom; and among the Pondos and Xhosas, the size is dependent on circumstances, for
example, that the father of the daughter may demand more lobolo after the birth of the child.
93 See also Bennett (n 33) at 234; Herbst and Du Plessis (n 13) at 7.
94 Bhe supra (n 6) para 5.
95 Matlala v Dlamini and Another supra (n 77).
96 Our emphasis.
97 Nthejane and Another v Road Accident Fund (3183/2010) [2011] ZAFSHC 196 (1 December
2011).
98 Ibid at para 8.
99 Ibid at para 2.
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customary practices.100 From the foregoing decision it would appear that
an agreement by parties that lobolo will be delivered sufﬁces.101
Other courts’ decisions seem to suggest that partial delivery of lobolo is
necessary to hold that the marriage is valid.102 For example, in the case of
Matlala v Dlamini103 the applicant, the mother and the sole surviving
parent of the deceased, sought an order for the court to declare that no
valid customary marriage existed between the deceased and the ﬁrst
respondent (wife of the deceased). The effect of such an order was to
exclude the ﬁrst respondent from any beneﬁts from the estate or the
pension fund of the deceased. The Matlala and Dlamini families were
respectively Pedi and Swati. The Dlamini family regarded the couple as
lawfully married in accordance with their (Swati) customs because of the
partial payment of lobolo.104 As for the Matlala family, the applicant
averred that in accordance with their (Pedi) customs, the couple was not
lawfully married because the families agreed that the proposed marriage
was to be regulated by the Pedi law, which requires full payment of lobolo.
In holding that a valid marriage existed, the court stated: ‘In the authori-
ties that I have consulted, I could not ﬁnd a relevant difference between
baPedi and siSwati customs.’
In another case, Mmutle v Thindwa,105 the applicant, the biological
daughter of the deceased, instituted an action to have a customary union
between her deceased father and the ﬁrst respondent declared null and
void. She stated that, according to Tswana custom, the requirement of full
payment of lobolo was not met because the deceased, her father, only made
part payment thereof. In dismissing the application and holding that the
marriage was valid, the court held that part payment was sufﬁcient and
that the ceremonies and exchange of gifts do not have any legal conse-
quences for the validity of a customary union or marriage. Similarly, in
J.B.M v G.K.M,106 the plaintiff sued the defendant for a divorce, division
100 Ibid at para 9.
101 See also MG v BM supra (n 23) in which the court held that the marriage was valid based
on the fact that the agreement of lobolo was met on 8 June 2000 (paras 5 and 12). In this case the
applicant sought, among others, an order to have her customary marriage registered after the
death of her deceased husband. The application was opposed by ﬁrst respondent basing her
argument on the fact that there was no lobolo negotiation between the applicant and the
deceased families (para 6). The contrary is also true: absence of lobolo agreement will render the
marriage void. Such was the decision in Manona v Alice Parlour [2002] JOL 9717 (Ck) (as cited
by Women’s Legal Centre (n 3) 9) where the applicant made an urgent application for an
interdict preventing the second respondent from removing the body of the deceased daughter
and burying it. The court held that no valid marriage existed because there was no agreement
that lobolo would be paid
102 This is irrespective of the fact that full payment of lobolo, the requirement according to
custom or as agreed by parties, was not met.
103 Supra (n 77).
104 See also Fanti supra (n 75) paras 19 and 20.
105 Mmutle v Thindwa (20949/2007) [2008] ZAGPHC 352 (23 July 2008).
106 J.B.M v G.K.M (20622/06) North Gauteng Division, High Court,April 2009.
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of the joint estate and ancillary relief. The plaintiff and the defendant were
from different tribal groups, which unfortunately were not mentioned in
the court decision. In the particulars of claim the plaintiff alleged that a
valid customary marriage existed, having complied with all customary
requirements, including the fact that full payment (R2000.00) of lobolo
was made by the defendant. The defendant denied that a valid marriage
existed because the R2000.00 was only a deposit on the lobolo and a
customary marriage would only come into being when the full balance of
lobolo was paid.107 The court, however, held that the marriage was valid,
and that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed with her action for
divorce.108
In as much as the courts’ decisions seem to illustrate that partial delivery
of lobolo sufﬁces to recognise a marriage as valid, there are some decisions
that suggest that this would not always sufﬁce and that full delivery of
lobolo is required. In Motsoatsoa v Roro and others,109 for example, the issue
before the court was whether a valid marriage existed between the
applicant and the deceased. The applicant’s claim was that a valid marriage
existed, basing her argument on the facts that lobolo negotiations had taken
place, an amount of R18 000 had been agreed upon as lobolo, of which a
part payment of R5 000 had been made. In holding that no valid marriage
existed, the court observed that ‘ . . . the mere fact that lobolo was handed
over to the applicant’s family, signiﬁcant as it is, is not conclusive proof of
the existence of a valid customary marriage’.110 Similarly, in Mthembu v
Letsela the court failed to recognise a marriage as valid despite evidence to
the effect that part payment of lobolo was met.111
From the foregoing discussion, we see that conﬂicting decisions have
been reached by our courts in determining the validity of a customary
marriage based on lobolo. Some courts’ interpretation of s 3(1)(b) of the
Act has directly challenged a woman’s own perception of her marital
status from married to unmarried, and in the process severely disadvan-
taged her, particularly from being a beneﬁciary to the deceased husband’s
estate.112
The conﬂicting court decisions as to whether full, partial or mere
agreement on lobolo is a requirement or not to conclude a valid customary
marriage demonstrates a lack of legal certainty, which attempts to protect
the institution of marriage and not vulnerable parties.
107 Ibid at para 7.
108 Ibid at para 16.
109 Motsoatsoa supra (n 75).
110 Ibid at para 18. See also Ndhlovu (n 75) to be discussed later under formal integration.
111 See discussion of the case by Janse van Rensburg (n 5) at 9.
112 See, for example, Fanti supra (n 75); Mthembu supra (n 28); Motsoatsoa supra (n 75).
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(b) Formal integration of the bride
In discussing our courts’ approach on the requirement of formal integra-
tion of a woman into her husband’s family, Fanti v Boto is instructive. The
court observed:
All authorities are in agreement that a valid customary marriage only comes
about when the girl (in this case the deceased) has been formerly transferred or
handed over to her husband or his family. Once that is done severance of ties
between her and her family happens. Her acceptance by the groom’s husband
and her incorporation into his family is ordinarily accompanied by well
known extensive ritual and ceremonies involving both families.113
However, just like with lobolo, all authorities do not seem to be in
agreement. Court decisions are at odds as to whether formal integration of
the bride is essential to the validity of a customary marriage or not. In
Mabuza v Mbatha,114 where according to siSwati law, formal integration
(ukumekeza) of the bride into her husband’s family had not been met, the
court held that this omission was not fatal and themarriage was recognised
as valid.115 Similarly, in Maluleke & Others v Minister of Home Affairs and
Others116 the court held that ‘ . . . although the parties also intended to
celebrate the marriage by holding an imvume, the fact that the celebration
of their marriage in the form of imvume did not occur does not, in my
judgement, detract from that conclusion’.117 In both Mabuza and
Maluleke, courts waived the requirement of formal integration and found
that the marriages were valid. These two decisions then suggest that
formal integration is no longer a valid customary marriage requirement.
Contrary to the approach adopted in Mabuza and Maluleke, in Ndlovu v
Mokoena, Department of Education and Department of Home Affairs118 and
Motsoatsoa v Roro and the Department of Home Affairs (discussed earlier
under lobolo) the court held, respectively, that a customary marriage was
invalid because the ukumekeza custom (formal delivery of the woman to
the groom’s family) had not been observed, and that it remained an
essential requirement for the validity of a customary marriage. Similar
113 Fanti supra (n 75) at para 22.
114 Mabuza v Mbatha 2003 (4) SA218 (C).
115 Ibid at paras 25 and 27.
116 Maluleke and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [2008] JOL 21827 (W).
117 Ibid at para 16.
118 In Ndhlovu supra (n 75), discussed brieﬂy earlier, before the court there were two
customary marriage certiﬁcates that were issued by the Department of Home Affairs, one
presented by the applicant and the other one by the ﬁrst respondent in the case. The ﬁrst
respondent’s certiﬁcate (25 May 1991) predated that of the applicant (dated 25 May 1998). Both
certiﬁcates were issued after the death of the deceased (2008) and by the same marriage ofﬁcer.
The court, however, found that there was no valid marriage due to non-fulﬁlment of the
requirement of formal integration of the bride, despite the fact that there was a marriage
certiﬁcate.
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approaches are also seen in the cases of Manona v Alice Funeral Parlour119
where the court held that without formally handing over of the woman
no valid marriage came into existence.
The contradictory approach taken by courts on the issue of formal
integration of a bride potentially leaves women without legal protection
or at least without legal certainty as to their position. It also leads us to
Mwambene and Sloth-Nielsen’s120 question: ‘have only some communi-
ties’ customary laws changed – the siSwati in Mabuza’s scenario – to
eliminate the requirement of formal delivery of a woman to her husband
family?’121 How, and to what extent, does the courts’ approach in a case
like Mabuza protect women in other communities? How can legal
certainty be promoted in the face of these contradictions?122
IV ANALYSIS OF STATEAND COURT RESPONSES
It is clear that different responses to the need to comply with ‘form’ by
both the state and courts have led to a lack of legal certainty.123 The state
and courts’ responses show that, for the most part, a strict approach is
taken to ‘form’. In many cases, the failure of the parties to comply with a
‘strict, black letter, deﬁnitional analysis’of the relationship has resulted in a
ﬁnding that a valid marriage does not exist, and – as a result – no rights or
obligations exist.124 This prioritisation of form over function may, in part,
be attributable to a legal culture, which has been described as conservative
in jurisprudential outlook, where lawyers and judges are predisposed to
interpret the law in a ‘highly structured, technicist, literal and rule-bound’
way.125 In the light of such an observation, we are left wondering,
precisely what lessons we can draw from this insight. What type of
approach is likely to promote the protective nature of the family? We
wonder whether the choices are quite that desolate; that is to say, is the
protection of women’s rights best achieved if the state and courts are given
a wide discretion when dealing with the validity of a customary marriage?
119 Manona v Alice Funeral Parlor [2002] JOL 9717 (CK), as cited by Justice College (n 78) ch 3
at 25.
120 Mwambene and Sloth-Nielsen (n 13) at 32.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 Mwambene and Sloth-Nielsen (ibid) characterise the courts’ response as ‘a tendency to
deal with customary law on a rather casuistic basis, with different results from time to time
prevailing.’
124 See Meyersfeld (n 29) at 276 who argues that the court has adopted the deﬁnitional
approach in relation to cohabitation relationships. This overemphasis on form in relation to
customary marriages has also been the concern of Chanock (n 43) and Van Rensburg (n 5).
125 See K Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 146.
For descriptions of the South African legal culture, in agreement with Klare, see P Langa
‘Transformative constitutionalism’ (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review 351 and A van der Walt
‘Legal history, legal culture and transformation in a constitutional democracy’ (2006) 12
Fundamina 36.
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We might echo it as a choice in ignoring formalities.126 Reliance on
judicial discretion and activism is certainly not a sufﬁcient measure to
protect women’s rights.
In addition, both state and court decisions have shown that legislating
requirements to conclude a customary marriage, coupled with contradic-
tory courts’ interpretation and ofﬁcial responses, frustrate the legal protec-
tion of women involved in these marriages. This is clearly not the
objective of theAct, which states that it was passed in an effort to equalise
the status of the spouses in the relationship.127 How then should women,
who believed that they were in a valid customary marriage, be protected?
V RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Adopting a functional approach to the relationship
As intimated earlier, considering the function of these relationships seems
to be a sensible solution, albeit one which has a much wider effect than on
customary marriages alone.Apossible problem with this suggestion in the
context of customary marriages is that ‘. . . as a social fact, marriage and
family are inseparable inAfrican customary law.’128 There is the possibility
that, by relying on the function of the relationship, we somehow diminish
the status of customary marriage. However, the same could be said of civil
marriage in the Roman-Dutch law context, where family was deﬁned in
terms of the relationship that arose from the marriage.129 In this context,
while we should consider this reality, law – whether civil or customary –
needs to adapt to the needs of a changing society. There is every reason to
question the privileging of one type of family form, namely marriage, and
to give secondary, or no status at all, to other family forms.130
If we are to lose our obsession with form, the question that we need to
ask is: do the relationships that are not recognised by the state and courts
fulﬁl the same function as marriage?131 If the answer is in the afﬁrmative,
126 For example, Mabena supra (n 85) and Mabuza supra (n 53).
127 See the preamble to theAct.
128 T Nhlapo ‘The African family and women: friends or foes?’ 1991 Acta Juridica 135 at 136.
See also Koyana (n 33) at 5.
129 Nhlapo (n 127) at 135.
130 See Kaganas and Murray (n 8) 116–117 where they question whether the privileging of
marriage over other family forms is simply ethnocentric prejudice or whether there are
justiﬁcations for denying recognition to certain family forms. It could also be argued that the
functional approach does not really diminish marriage per se, but simply gets the state out of the
‘marriage business’ in so far as form is required.
131 The functional approach generally accepts that the family is the natural repository for
inevitable dependency, and that the state’s interest in marriage is to support a unit that will direct
dependency away from the state. In other words, the supportive network that marriage creates
bears the burden of dependency, without demanding public resources to do so. For a
description (and a critique) of this view, see Fineman (n 11) at 2205 and 2214. See also, in
general, J Millbank ‘The role of ‘‘functional family’’ in same-sex family recognition trends’
(2008) 20 Child and Family Law Quarterly 1.
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then there is strong need to protect those people living in such a family
relationship. This is the gist of the functional approach. While the
functional approach to family law has, in the main, been called upon in
relation to the debate on same-sex partnerships and cohabitation,132 there
is good reason why we should question obsession with form in relation to
customary marriages as well. As far back as 1991 Chanock did just this in
relation to the debate on recognising the customary family unit, when he
stated that ‘ . . . deﬁning a form of marriage is not really vital.’133 Rather,
he said, ‘we should concentrate on a family law system which embodies
only those necessary protections to those vulnerable in family relation-
ships, thereby abjuring cultural symbolism of any kind’.134
In noting the inconsistent approach to form by the state and courts, an
approach that focuses on function and dependency appears to be consis-
tent with a true equality determination. We are asking for recognition
that, even though a relationship does not comply with the ‘form’ of
marriage, vulnerable parties in such a relationship should be protected.
This protection follows if one accepts that such a relationship often plays
the same social role as marriage and that the parties may provide support
in the same way as married couples do. This approach accords with the
protective rationale of family law, which requires that weaker parties
should not be left impoverished ‘when long-term, mutually supportive,
ﬁnancially interdependent relationships end, whether or not they have
formalised their relationships’.135
While the Constitutional Court has appeared to endorse the functional
view of the family, and endorsed the need to protect those vulnerable in
family relationships,136 the reality is that it has only been prepared to do so
132 See, for example, Millbank (n 130); N Polikoff ‘Law that values all families: beyond
(straight and gay) marriage’ (2009) 22 Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 85;
andN Polikoff ‘Makingmarriagematter less: theALI domestic partner principles are one step in
the right direction’ (2004) The University of Chicago Legal Forum 354. On the local front, see
Meyerson (n 24); Meyersfeld (n 29); as well as P de Vos ‘The ‘‘inevitability’’ of same-sex
marriage in South Africa’s post-apartheid state’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 452. See the dissenting
judgment of Sachs J in Volks NO v Robinson 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) paras 163, 173 and 181.
See also, in general, South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 104 (Project
118) Domestic Partnerships (2003).
133 Chanock (n 43) at 65.
134 Chanock (n 43) at 68. See also Kaganas and Murray (n 8) 116–117.
135 See Meyerson (n 24) at 295.
136 See for instance Daniels v Campbell NO 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) para 77 (per Moseneke J:
‘we must approach the issues in the present matter on the basis that family life as contemplated
by the Constitution can be provided in different ways and that legal conceptions of the family
and what constitutes family life should change as social practices and traditions change.’) See
also the statement byAckermann J in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of
Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 47 where he speaks about an ‘accelerating process of
transformation [that] has taken place in family relationships as well as in societal and legal
concepts regarding the family and what it comprises.’ See also the oft-repeated extra-curial
statement of Albie Sachs (former Constitutional Court judge) in J Eekelaar and T Nhlapo (eds)
The Changing Family: Family Forms and Family Law (1998) at xi: ‘[A]s far as family law is
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by the yardstick of marriage.137 The focus on equality, then, and attempt
to ‘equalise’ customary marriage with civil marriage, has masked the real
issue, being the obsession with marriage. For instance, the Constitutional
Court has been accused of adopting a ‘constricted marriage model’138 and
‘putting marriage on a pedestal’.139
So, even if customary marriage remains as a cultural institution, there is
good reason why the state and courts should come to the assistance of a
party where dependency akin to that found in the traditional marriage
relationship is found. In practical terms, this could mean that while a court
would not ascribe the status of ‘marriage’ to the relationship, it could
make a just and fair order to conclude the ﬁnancial consequences when
such a relationship dissolves. This would take us back to the ‘judicial
discretion’ model originally proposed by the SALRC Commission in
relation to unregistered domestic partnerships.140 However, we would go
one step further and advocate that this be the only recognised model, and
leave ‘marriage’ per se to the private domain.141 Such a model would be
applicable to all intimate relationships, then, not just customary marriages.
If we are to reﬂect on s 31 of the Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963
(where limited recognition was given to wives from customary marriages
in actions dealing with the negligent causation of the death of the
breadwinner) we see that the aim was to protect the woman and not the
institution of marriage per se.
concerned, we in South Africa have it all. We have every kind of family: extended families,
nuclear families, one-parent families, same-sex families. . . . Our families are suffused with
history, as family law is suffused with history, culture, belief and personality.’
137 The court has continually spoken about marriage in foundational terms – see, for example,
Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) paras 30–31, 36–37 and 52 and Volks
supra (n 131). In both Hassam v Jacobs NO 2009 (5) SA 572 (CC) and Daniels supra (n 135), the
court was willing to extend the protections of marriage to Muslim unions not because they were
deemed to be functionally comparable to marriage, but because the court thought that these
unions ‘deserved the ‘‘honoriﬁc’’ of marriage’ (see Meyerson (n 24) at 304).
138 Meyerson (n 24) at 312.
139 Meyersfeld (n 29) at 289.
140 South African Law Reform Commission (Project 118) Report on Domestic Partnerships
(2006) 366–367. Maithuﬁ and Moloi (n 23) at 153 suggest that it would be preferable ‘if a single
new measure can be enacted which regulates the solemnization, consequences and dissolution
of all types or forms of recognized marriage in South Africa.’ While this suggestion will deal
with the plethora of legislation and bills recognizing different types of relationships, it still places
‘marriage’ at its centre, and therefore potentially leaves women in intimate relationships out in
the cold.
141 Cf the suggestion by Maithuﬁ and Bekker (n 74) at 174–175 that ‘[t]he problems relating
to proof of the existence of a customary marriage cannot be solved by bringing domestic
partnerships within the ambit of the law.’ It is submitted that this suggestion relies on the
continued reliance of marriage as the only recognised family form, as is evident in their
consequent explanation: ‘A customary marriage is a marriage in its own right. By trying to
resolve the lack of proof by applying to it the shenanigans of giving effect to ‘‘partnerships’’
would further confuse the issues.’
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Critics may argue that the obvious problem with this ‘levelling down’
of all relationships in the context of customary law (at least in terms of
state recognition), is that it ignores cultural value and meaning, which is
protected by ss 15, 30 and 31 of the Constitution. As mentioned above,
family and marriage in customary law are so closely interlinked, that
recourse to function could potentially negate customary law. However,
we do not think this is an insurmountable problem if one takes the
approach that function will be ascribed to all relationships, not only
customary unions. Particular religious or cultural communities will still be
able to decide for themselves how to structure their institutions and give
meaning to that institution.142 It simply means that the state will not play a
part in building that meaning.
However given the way in which family law in South Africa has
developed to date, turning to a functional approach appears to be a
long-term project to be tackled not only in relation to all relationships,
but also in the face of countless legislation and bills dealing with the
recognition of different family forms.143 In this regard, South Africa
would do well to consider the work undertaken by the Canadian Law
Reform Commission on family form and function,144 which has been
characterised as ‘the most comprehensive analysis . . . of the reasons to
extend the reach of the law beyond marriage.’145 This reform looks to
recognise adult relationships characterised by emotional intimacy and
economic interdependence – the very areas which can be shown by most
women in the customary marriage decisions discussed so far.
(2) Adopting the putative marriage doctrine
If the functional approach implies a ‘bridge too far’ in the immediate
future, it appears to us that the women in many of the relationships
described above could have been protected if the principles of the
putative marriage doctrine were applied.146 The application of the doc-
142 This is in fact provided for in s 211(2) of the Constitution, in relation to traditional
authorities at least. In this regard, the case of Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) shows
how the tribal authorities changed the custom of male-only chieftainship to bring it into line
with the constitutional guarantee of equality.
143 The recent SALRC discussion paper on the harmonisation of legislation in South Africa
dealing with family law shows up the short-comings of different pieces of legislation dealing
with relationships that often fulﬁll the same function in society, but have different consequences
for the parties. See in general, the South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper
130 (Project 25) Statutory Law Revision (Family Law and Marriage) (2011).
144 Law Commission of Canada Beyond Conjugality: Recognising and Supporting Close and
Personal Adult Relationships (2001). See discussions of this report in N Polikoff ‘All families
matter: what the law can do about it’ (2004) 25 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 205; and N Polikoff
‘Ending marriage as we know it’ (2003–2004) 32 Hofstra Law Review 201.
145 Polikoff (2003–2004) (n 144) at 202.
146 For a description of the origin of the doctrine, see Clark (n 27) at 167–168. In relation to
customary marriages, see Janse van Rensburg (n 5) where she makes the suggestion that the
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trine – as a stop-gap measure – seems an obvious solution, since (1) the
doctrine is primarily concerned with equity; and (2) application of the
doctrine would still allow for the recognition of customary practice, by
bringing cultural evidence into court to establish whether the claimant
bona fide believed that she had met the requirements of a customary
marriage.147
It is trite that the putative marriage doctrine operates where one or
both of the parties bona fide believe that they entered into a lawful
marriage, even if the marriage was de facto void due to non-compliance
with an essential requirement.148 The doctrine allows the court to
consider the intention or bona fides of the parties in dealing with the
patrimonial consequences of the partnership149 and to order a division of
assets accordingly. It also allows the court to declare the children of such
relationship to be born of married parents.150 The putative marriage
doctrine would also allow for the bona fide spouse to inherit intestate.151
Indeed, a version of this doctrine was incorporated into ofﬁcial customary
law in terms of reg 2 of the Regulations for the Administration and
Distribution of Estates of Deceased Blacks,152 which provided in sub-s (d)
that
[w]hen any deceased Black is survived by any partner –
(iii) who was at the time of his death living with him as his putative spouse;
. . . and the circumstances are such as in the opinion of the Minister to
render the application of Black law and custom to the devolution of the
whole, or some part, of his property inequitable . . . the Minister may
direct that the said property . . . shall devolve as if the (parties) . . . had been
lawfully married out of community of property, whether or not such was
in fact the case . . . and as if the said person had been a European.153
While this regulation is no longer in force,154 there is no reason why a
court could not invoke the doctrine in order to protect those in relation-
court in the Mthembu case could have found that the relationship in issue was a putative one.
Smith (n 29) calls on the doctrine in the context of anticipated registered domestic partnerships
under the Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008.
147 Laymon (n 13) at 376.
148 Heaton (n 21) at 39–40.
149 Here, in respect of the bona fide party, the court will give effect to either the default
matrimonial property regime that would have applied to the marriage, or the intended
matrimonial property regime of the couple.
150 Cf Mthembu supra (n 28).
151 Sinclair and Heaton (n 14) 409; and Hahlo (n 31) 115–116. It should be noted that such an
assertion has never been tested in court: see Smith (n 29) at 580.
152 GN R200 GG10601 of 6 February 1987, as amended by GN R1501GG 24120 of 3
December 2002.
153 Our emphasis.
154 The whole of GN R200 of 1987, as amended (n 150), was declared invalid in the Bhe
supra (n 6) decision as per para 3 of the order set out in para 136 of the judgment. Such
declaration of invalidity was not based on the application of the statutory version of the
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ships that do not strictly comply with form. In this way, the court could
have found that the woman in issue deserved protection, even if the court
did not believe that one or more of the essentialia of the marriage had been
met, including the payment of the full lobolo amount, or the formal
integration of the bride.155
It is not suggested that a court need follow the regulation’s direction
that the parties be deemed to be married out of community of property.
Instead, the court should apply the doctrine as found in the common law,
based on the parties’ bona fide and intent in relation to the application of
customary law to their marriage. The putative marriage doctrine could be
very powerful in these circumstances since it focuses on intent and belief,
and as such, could be judged in terms of whether the party believed she
was entering into a customary marriage, rather than a civil marriage.156
There is the concern that the doctrine could allow parties to assert an
obligation based on ‘ignorance of the law’. However, many successful
putative marriage claims rely on some ignorance of the law.157 In the
context of parties in rural contexts, this is in fact the reality. Since the
putative marriage doctrine is primarily concerned with equity, it would
be short-sighted to deny a claimant relief based on ignorance. Further-
more, it is unlikely that this will be a real problem simply because of the
threshold requirement that the belief is bona fide and related to a genuine
system of customary law.158
VI CONCLUSION
It is fairly clear that the application of the Act by both state and courts (as
discussed above) has not led to the greater protection of women –
especially in terms of recognising their marriage at the registration stage,
and at the validity stage. Women have often been left out in the cold
where requirements are not deemed to have been met, notwithstanding
the long-term nature of their relationships.159 This has been the case, even
common law to customary marriages, but rather on the male primogeniture rule, which applied
in relation to matters of succession in customary settings.
155 See Janse van Rensburg (n 5) at 12 who opines that the SCA could have considered the
parties as putative spouses in terms of this regulation so as to keep with the principles of natural
justice and equity, instead of an outcome that left the minor child of the union without an
inheritance and without support.
156 In this way, the court could still take cognisance of the customary law requirements.
157 B Clark ‘The law of marriage’ in B Clark (ed) Family Law Service (2008) issue 24 paraA-62.
For example, Ex Parte Soobiah: in re Est Pillay1948 (1) SA 873 (N) 881 (where the parties to a
Hindu marriage failed to register their marriage where legislation required it), M v M 1962 (2)
SA114 (GW) 116 (where the parties were related to one another within the prohibited degrees
of marriage), and Ngubane v Ngubane 1983 (2) SA 770 (T) (where one spouse’s previous
marriage had not been dissolved at the time of the subsequent marriage).
158 Laymon (n 13) at 365.
159 For example, in Motsoatsoa supra (n 75), although the parties had lived together in the same
house until the death of the deceased, their marriage was declared invalid due to so-called
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in the face of obvious dependency and the relationship operating like a
customary marriage. In a few cases, courts have been generous in their
interpretation of customary law requirements for a customary marriage,
either enforcing or negating customary law requirements and justifying
this discretionary approach on ‘developing customary law in accordance
with the spirit, purport and ideals of the Bill of Rights’.160 While the latter
approach is laudable, the lack of a ‘predictable pattern of adjudication’ has
its obvious shortcomings, especially with regard to the protection of
women in situations where they are able to afford litigation on the
issue.161 Women are then faced with contrary case decisions as to what the
content of the customary requirements are for a valid marriage. The
inconsistent outcomes by both state and courts then have the potential to
create ‘hybrid descriptions of customary practices that do not really exist
in any culture’.162
In many of the cases where women attempted to register their marriage
or have such marriage recognised by the court, they believed in good faith
that they were married according to customary rites.163 In many of the
cases they had been living together with the other party, bore children and
shared conjugal relations.164 It seems counterintuitive then to cut these
women off with no rights whatsoever.
Our response to this dilemma has been twofold. We recognise that this
response is dogged by the issue of real access to courts. This is a policy
reform measure that needs to be seriously considered by the Department
of Justice and Constitutional Development.165 Ideally, South Africa
should be looking towards a wholesale revision to family law in general,
with emphasis on function and dependency. This wholesale revision will
change the emphasis from the institution of marriage itself, to the nature
of the supportive relationship itself. By doing so, vulnerable parties in the
relationship are protected, as should be the case. This would, by its very
nature, include those in customary-type settings. Realistically, we realise
that this is a long-term project. Thus, in the meantime, following other
legal commentators,166 we suggest that the putative marriage doctrine
should be applied where a customary marriage’s validity is contested.
non-compliance with the requirement of formal integration. See also Ndhlovu supra (n 75) and
Fanti supra (n 75).
160 As was the case in Mabena supra (n 85) para 111. See also Janse van Rensburg (n 5) at 35.
161 Laymon (n 13) at 362–363.
162 Ibid.
163 Motsoatsoa supra (n 75).
164 Ibid.
165 The issue of access to justice is simply too large to ignore, but too complex to discuss here.
Access of a geographical, ﬁnancial and educational form needs to be considered.
166 Laymon (n 13); Janse van Rensburg (n 5); Smith (n 29).
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